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The Crime of "Causing Traffic": Can the Criminal Civil
Rights Statutes Target Public Corruption?
Leslie B. Arffa*
An unlikely statutory candidate has recently emerged to aid the federal prose-
cution of state and local public corruption: the criminal civil rights statutes. In the
wake of newly placed limitations on other sources of criminal liability in this area,
the government's reliance on these statutes may increase in the future. Given the
contentious nature of the debate concerning the Justice Department's role in prose-
cuting both public corruption and civil rights crimes, the potential employment of
this old statutory tool in a new area deserves more considerable attention.
While a great deal of scholarship focuses on the qualified immunity doctrine
surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 1983, very little study has been devoted to its criminal
cousins, 28 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 241. This essay canvasses the rare but storied em-
ployment of the criminal civil rights statutes in a variety of contexts, and the doc-
trinal confusion surrounding them. It ultimately answers the questioned posed in
its title in both the affirmative and the negative. While § 242 might present a via-
ble candidate for targeting public corruption, § 241 presents ubstantial constitu-
tional concerns if used in this context.
INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 2017, Bridget Kelly and Bill Baroni, two former aides of New
Jersey Governor Chris Christie, were each sentenced to terms in federal prison
for their roles in the infamous "Bridgegate" scandal.' The government demon-
strated at trial that Baroni and Kelly shut down two access lanes from Fort Lee,
N.J. onto the George Washington Bridge to exact retribution on Mayor Mark
Sokolich for refusing to endorse Governor Christie for re-election.' Most of the
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coverage of the sordid Bridgegate scandal and ensuing trial focused on whether
Governor Christie played any role in the series of events that resulted in 2,800
vehicle hours of delay on the Fort Lee lanes each day.3
From the perspective of both federal criminal and civil rights law, however,
the Bridgegate prosecution is notable not for leaving Governor Christie out of
the courtroom, but instead for the manner in which it forced his aides into it.
The jury convicted Baroni and Kelly of violating a statute the casual observer
might be surprised to see used in this context: the criminal civil rights statutes.4
The criminal civil rights statutes trace their origins back to the post-
Reconstruction era. 18 U.S.C. § 242, rooted in the Civil Rights Act of 18661
makes it a federal crime to "under color of any law ... willfully subject any per-
son ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."6 Section 241, root-
ed in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and entitled "Conspiracy Against Rights,"
does not require that a person be acting "under color of law," and instead tar-
gets "two or more persons [who] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or in-
timidate any person ... in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privi-
lege."7
The jury convicted Baroni and Kelly of violating § 242 under a theory that
they acted under "color of law" to deprive the residents of Fort Lee of their
constitutional "right to localized travel on public roadways free from
restrictions unrelated to legitimate government objectives."' Similarly they were
convicted of violating § 241 under a theory that they "conspired" to "oppress"
the residents of Fort Lee of their "right to localized travel." This was a novel
way to frame an indictment. As defense counsel noted with great derision in a
pre-trial motion, "[t]here has never been a criminal civil rights prosecution
where a defendant is alleged to have caused traffic."o
3. Kate Zernike, The Bridgegate Scandal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/nyregion/george-washington-bridge-scandal-what
-you-need-to-know.html [http://perma.cc/YA2Z-ES6A].
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (2012).
5. Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Feder-
al Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2113, 2138 (1993).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 242. This provision also created a private civil cause of action.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 241.
8. Indictment at 36, United States v. Baroni, No. 15-193 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2015), 2015
WL 2127949 [hereinafter Indictment].
9. Id.
1o. Memorandum of Law in Support of Ms. Kelly's Motion to Dismiss the Indict-
ment in its Entirety at 3, United States v. Baroni, No. 15-193 (D.N.J. Feb. 1,
2016), 2016 WL 614325 (emphasis added). Of course many citizens of New Jersey
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To be sure, Baroni and Kelly were also convicted of violating several stat-
utes often employed to combat public corruption, ranging from wire fraud to
federal program bribery." Yet the Supreme Court's narrowing of these avenues
of criminal liability has raised questions about their continued viability in the
public corruption area." Given the increasingly dramatic tenor over the debate
concerning the federal prosecution of local corruption,3 the emergence of a
new statutory tool in this much-debated area deserves more attention.
The doctrine surrounding the criminal civil rights statutes has generated a
great deal of confusion among courts and scholars alike.4 The literature on
these statutes is itself limited, and the potential use of the statutes in the public
corruption context has gone largely unstudied.'5 The lack of scholarly commen-
nt. See United States v. Kelly, No. 15-193, 2017 WL 1233891, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 30,
2017). Baroni and Kelly were charged and convicted under the federal program
bribery statute pursuant to the theory that they "misapplied" the federal funds de-
voted to the Port Authority in using Port Authority personnel and resources to
"facilitate and conceal the causing of traffic problems in Fort Lee as punishment
of Mayor Sokolich." They were also charged and convicted of violating the wire
fraud statute under the theory that they "obtain[ed] money and property from
the Port Authority and deprive[d] the Port Authority of its right to control its
own assets by falsely representing and causing false representations to be made
that the lane and toll booth reductions were for the purpose of a traffic study." See
Indictment, supra note 8, at 5, 28-29.
12. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (overturning the conviction of
Governor of Virginia Robert McDonnell of violating the federal bribery statute
and narrowing the interpretation of the term "official act" in the statute). The
McDonnell decision has been cited in several recent decisions overturning convic-
tions on public corruption-related charges. See, e.g., United States v. Skelos, 707 F.
App'x 733, 737 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the jury instruction "invites convic-
tion on acts outside Dean Skelos's official duties as defined by McDonnell"); Unit-
ed States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2017) ("[T~he Government's own
summation confirms that the jury instructions conveyed an erroneous under-
standing of the law as clarified by McDonnell."); see also United States v. Skilling,
561 U.S. 358 (2010) (limiting viability of the mail and wire fraud statutes in this
context); Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, Skilling: Is it Really a Game-Changer
for Mail and Wire Fraud Cases?, 1831 CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK 933,
938-39 (2010) (surveying 600 published decisions under the honest services stat-
ute and concluding that "the overwhelming majority of [public corruption] cases
involved allegations of a bribe or kickback").
13. Justice Thomas, for example, has consistently decried the "stunning expansion of
federal criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by state and local
laws-acts of public corruption by state and local officials." United States v. Ev-
ans, 504 U.S. 255, 290 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. See infra Part II.
15. Literature on the statutes' employment in the criminal context has either tracked
its use from a historical perspective, see sources cited infra Part II, or focused on
its employment in the police brutality context, see, for example, Jack M. Beer-
mann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law,
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tary concerning the criminal civil rights statutes remains all the more surprising
given the voluminous scholarship concerning their civil counterpart, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1983.6
Furthermore, the criminal civil rights statutes have always retained enor-
mous political valence. As Judge Paul Watford has noted, "the survival of Sec-
tion 242 meant that the federal government would have a role in combating the
widespread problem of police brutality toward African Americans and other
minorities, particularly in the South."" And, former Attorney General Eric
Holder's "parting shot" upon leaving office was a call for the imposition of
"new standards" for prosecuting criminal civil rights offenses." These calls have
been echoed with greater force in recent years, with the controversy over the
potential federal prosecution of Officer Dan Pantaleo for the killing of Eric
Garner providing but one particularly prominent example.9
Just as the criminal civil rights statutes have attracted controversy, so too
has federal prosecution of state and local corruption remained a contested en-
terprise. The tension inherent in attempting to provide external oversight of lo-
cal governments while safeguarding the states' traditional police power is re-
flected in federal legislation. Only one federal statute refers explicitly to the
corruption of state and local officials, that which criminalizes the bribery of
such officials in connection with the receipt of federal funds.o Yet federal offi-
42 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1989); Arthur B. Caldwell & Sydney Brodie, Enforcement of
the Criminal Civil Rights Statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 242, in Prison Brutality Cases,
52 GEO. L.J. 706 (1964); and David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aber-
rations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 18 (1999).
16. See, e.g., Will Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALF. L. REv. 101
(2016); John C. Jeffries, What's Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV.
851 (2010); Joanna Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2
(2017).
17. Paul J. Watford, Screws v. United States and the Birth of Federal Civil Rights En-
forcement, 98 MARQ. L. REv. 465, 483 (2014).
18. Mike Allan, Holder's Parting Shot: It's Too Hard to Bring Civil Rights Cases,
POLITICO (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/eric-holder
-civil-rights-interview-mike-allen-115575 [http://perma.cc/ZB7V-8HLG].
19. Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman & William K. Rashbaum, Justice Department
Shapes up Inquiry into the Eric Garner Choke Hold, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/nyregion/justice-dept-replaces-investigators
-on-eric-garner-case.html [http://perma.cc/M9C3-RSU7].
20. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012); see Sarah Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal
Government's Authority to Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local Cor-
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cials are regularly called upon to investigate and prosecute local misconduct,
leading to creative uses of available statutes.2'
This Comment argues that the evolving use of the criminal civil rights stat-
utes to supplement public corruption prosecutions at the local level threatens a
tenuous equilibrium struck between the Department of Justice, federal courts,
and state and local prosecutors. Part I analyzes the history of the criminal civil
rights statutes, noting that they have always been surrounded by doctrinal con-
fusion. Part II assesses the statutes' evolving uses, highlighting the ways in
which they have been and can be used to punish public corruption especially at
the state and local level. Finally, Part III offers suggestions for ways in which
prosecutors can use the statutes in a manner that respects conested boundaries
between local and federal law enforcement. It ultimately argues that while § 242
can be employed successfully in discrete circumstances in the public corruption
context, § 241 presents grave constitutional concerns if used in this domain.
I. THE CRIMINAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
The criminal civil rights statutes' origins date back to the Reconstruction
era. Following the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a re-
sponse to the widespread violence and atrocities committed against recently
freed populations.' In the early 1870s, Congress passed a series of statutes that
created civil and criminal penalties designed to secure the rights established by
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.23 Taken collectively, these statutes
represented, to borrow from Milton Konvitz, "the first attempt in the history of
mankind to destroy the branches of slavery after its root had been destroyed."4
The origins of §§ 242 and 241 can be found in these early efforts to ensure
racial equality.5 Responding to a major threat to federal power, the criminal
civil rights statutes create a potentially breathtakingly broad source of federal
criminal liability. Given that the specific contours of constitutional and statuto-
ry rights are subject to continuous revision by the federal courts and legislature,
the statutes essentially subject defendants to a federal criminal common law26
21. See Beale, supra note 20, at 699-700 (documenting the rise of federal prosecution
of local public corruption in the post-Watergate era and noting that, "Federal ju-
risdiction over political corruption at the state and local level is gradually expand-
ing to fulfill the same functions as the statutes punishing corruption within the
federal system"); see also sources and cases cited supra note 12, which provide
prominent examples of federal prosecution of state and local public corruption.
22. Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1323, 1323 (1952).
23. Id. at 1333-34.
24. MILTON R. KoNvITz, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 8 (1947).
25. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 2138.
26. Id.; see also DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STuNTz, DEFINING
FEDERAL CRIMES 409 (2014).
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Until the latter half of the twentieth century, however, federal enforcement of
criminal law was "practically moribund,"27 and thus the statutes were "more as-
pirational than substantive."' Today, however, their uses have transformed a
great deal.
The waxing and waning of the utilization of the criminal civil rights statutes
tracks the federal government's evolving commitment to protecting civil rights
more broadly. Courts initially took a very restrictive view of the constitutional
rights protected by the statutes,2 9 and the executive branch exhibited reluctance
to use them as a mechanism in enforcing civil rights.3 0 Before the creation of the
Civil Rights Division in the U.S. Department of Justice in 1939, the federal gov-
ernment only twice pursued criminal convictions under § 242.31
Despite these inauspicious beginnings, during the mid-twentieth century,
the Justice Department began placing a renewed emphasis on civil rights en-
forcement.32 This period witnessed the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the creation of the Department's Civil Rights Division.33 Soon, propo-
nents of federal criminal enforcement of civil rights secured their first major
victory in the Supreme Court.34 Even amidst this first doctrinal victory, howev-
er, dissenting Justice William 0. Douglas offered substantial vagueness and
breadth concerns.35
27. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 2162.
28. Id.
29. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that the federal government
does not have plenary power to enforce unenumerated fundamental rights); Unit-
ed States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (overturning the defendants' convic-
tions for involvement in an attack on African Americans attempting to vote and
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized federal enforcement action
only where a state had violated an existing right).
30. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKY, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIvIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 at xxiv
(1985); Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecu-
tions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REv. 509, 608 (1993).
31. Brian R. Johnson & Phillip B. Bridgmon, Depriving Civil Rights, 34 CRIM. Jus. REV.
196, 198 (2000).
32. See, e.g., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIvIL RIGHTS (2007); BRIAN K.
LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1997).
33. LANDSBERG, supra note 32.
34. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (holding that the right of a qualified
voter in a state congressional primary election to have his vote cast is a right "se-
cured by the Constitution," and that "willful action" in falsely counting ballots in
such an election deprives voters of that right in violation of the precursor to
§ 242).
35. Id. at 330-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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As enforcement of the criminal civil rights statutes has evolved, the Su-
preme Court's attempts to more clearly define their limitations have generated
substantial confusion. First, the Court has never outlined a clear standard for
proving the requisite mens rea for the offense. In the landmark case on the sub-
ject, United States v. Screws, the Court held that a violation of § 242 requires
proof of "willfulness," meaning "bad purpose";"6 though not merely a "general-
ly bad purpose," elaborated the Court, but rather a purpose "to deprive [some-
one] of a constitutional right." 7 At the same time, the defendant need not be
thinking precisely in "constitutional terms."38
Some have argued that Screws too severely narrowed the application of the
statute in trying to assuage vagueness concerns, while others that it failed to al-
lay these concerns at all. 39 Many civil rights advocates hoped that the federal
government would use Screws to more forcefully prosecute civil rights crimes,
while others, including the dissenting justices in the Screws decision, worried
that federal enforcement would lead to the deflection of state responsibility in
this area.40
Regardless of whether one believes Screws went too far or not far enough,
no consensus has emerged on how to apply its holding in practice. As one ap-
pellate judge noted dryly in attempting to discern a culpability standard from
the holding, "Screws is not a model of clarity." 41
In defining the "rights protected" by the statutes, the Supreme Court has
tried to clarify their contours by tethering them to the qualified immunity doc-
trine.42 In the foundational case providing a new standard for the "rights pro-
tected" under § 242 (and soon extended to § 241), the Court concluded that,
"[slo conceived, the object of the 'clearly established' immunity standard is not
different from that of 'fair warning' as it relates to law 'made specific' for the
purpose of validly applying § 242."41 Courts of Appeals have taken the Court at
36. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945).
37. Id. at 107.
38. Id. at 106.
39. Compare Harry M. Shapiro, Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Violations, 46
CORNELL L. REv. 532, 534 (1961) ("[T]he emphasis which [Screws] placed upon
the requirement of willful intent, necessitated by the challenge of vagueness
brought against the statute, has drained the section of its strength."), with Edward
F. Malone, Legacy of the Reconstruction: The Vagueness of the Criminal Civil Rights
Statutes, 38 UCLA L. REv. 163, 170 (1990) ("This Comment concludes that the
Screws framework has never effectively solved the vagueness problem.").
40. Screws, 325 U.S. at 139 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
41. United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 1997).
42. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) ("Officers sued in a civil action
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do de-
fendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U.S.C. § 242.").
43. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997).
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its word and continued to assume that the "rights protected" by §§ 242, 241 and
1983 are synonymous."
This connection to qualified immunity has not generated an entirely con-
sistent case law on the subject across jurisdictions. In the context of analyzing
both of these statutes, the Courts of Appeals diverge on what constitutes "made
specific" just as they do on what constitutes "clearly established." Some circuits
look to Supreme Court doctrine, some to the relevant circuit precedent, and
still others to the relevant state court doctrine.45 As Erwin Chemerinsky and Ka-
ren M. Blum have noted, "The Supreme Court has been very inconsistent, and
certainly the lower courts are very inconsistent" with respect to the analysis of
whether a right was clearly established.46
Perhaps reflecting the doctrinal difficulties surrounding the statutes, prose-
cutions under either criminal civil rights statute remain subject to strict central-
ized control by The Department of Justice.47 The Department of Justice, for its
part, only rarely authorizes prosecutions under the statutes. In 2016, for exam-
44. See, e.g., L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 248 (3d Cir. 2016)
(demonstrating the connection between qualified immunity and § 242).
45. See, e.g., Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-41 (stating that "officials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances," and
further noting that "binding ... Circuit precedent" is such notice). But compare
Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (considering
"whether a particular right was clearly established as of a particular time" by ex-
amining whether the right had been "defined with reasonable clarity" and wheth-
er the Supreme Court or Circuit Court "had affirmed the existence of the
right"), with United States v. Morris, 494 F. App'x 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2012) (look-
ing to Supreme Court case law and the doctrine of other circuits and noting that
"even if specific case law did not exist," Morris's "conduct lies so obviously at the
very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits"), Schneyder v. Smith, 653
F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that in determining "whether a new scenario
is sufficiently analogous to previously established law to warn an official that
his/her conduct is unconstitutional," a court may look to "closely analogous
case[s]" or to evidence "that the Defendant's conduct was so patently violative of
the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance
from a court"), and United States v. Praisner, No. 09-264, 2010 WL 2574103, at *4
(D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2010) ("Although the Court cannot look to rulings in other
circuits to determine fair notice within the Second Circuit, it is instructive that
other circuits have held that the use of pepper spray can constitute excessive force
in certain circumstances.").
46. Erwin Chemerinsky & Karen M. Blum, Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests and
Searches in the Context of Qualified Immunity, 25 TOURo L. REv. 781, 787-88
(2009).
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ple, 137 civil rights prosecutions were brought against 224 defendants.4' The
next Part will demonstrate that while always subject to such oversight, the uses
of the statutes have evolved a great deal, placing them on a potential collision
course with doctrinal developments concerning federal oversight of state and
local public corruption.
II. EVOLVING USES AND POTENTIAL IN CONTESTED DOMAINS
Though the government does not often employ §5 242 or 241, its use of the
statutes has evolved over their histories. For over a century, prosecutors used §
242 almost entirely to prosecute racially motivated attacks and electoral intimi-
dation perpetrated by public officials.49 The vast majority of § 242 cases today
involve the agents of local criminal justice bodies."o By the early 2000s, the high-
est number of § 242 cases involved police personnel followed by correctional
personnel.? Following a statutory amendment to expressly include crimes of
sexual violence, the statute has increasingly been used to prosecute acts of sexu-
al assault committed by public officials.52 Employment of § 241, however, has
been even more rare than that of § 242, and almost all prosecutions under the
statute have involved deprivation of rights on account of race.5 3
Throughout their existences, however, both of the modern criminal civil
rights statutes have sometimes been applied in more unorthodox contexts. For
example, the statutes have been used in ferreting out civil fraud schemes,4 and
in prosecuting a variety of extortion related crimes.55
48. U.S. Attorneys' Annual Statistical Report, Fiscal Year 2015, U.S. DEP'T JUST., 11 tbl.
3A (2016), http://www.justice.gov/usaolpage/file/988896/download [http://
perma.cc/Y74T-FJMB].
49. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Lawrence, supra note 5,
at 2172. For a recent example of § 242's application to the police brutality context,
see United States v. Pendergrass, 648 F. App'x 29 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming convic-
tion of a probationary captain in the New York City Department of Correction
for violating § 242 after failing to act when an inmate housed in the mental health
unit ingested a ball of soap and eventually died).
50. Johnson & Bridgmon, supra note 31, at 201.
51. Id.
52. United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 30 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding conviction
of Connecticut mayor under 5 242 for engaging in sexual acts with a minor while
in office); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 259 (1997) (upholding constitu-
tionality of the statute in the context of the conviction of a state court judge under
18 U.S.C. § 242 for violating the constitutional rights of five women by sexually
assaulting them).
53. See RICHMAN, STITH, & STUNTZ, supra note 26, at 445.
54. United States v. Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1973); see also United States v.
Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming conviction).
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Though neglected in the literature, federal prosecutors also employed § 241
in the successful prosecution of President Nixon's Special Assistant John Ehr-
lichman for the covert operation to break into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding.s' This break-in was the first task for Nixon's
"plumbers" in a series of failed burglaries that culminated in the Watergate
scandal.5 Specifically, Ehrlichman was convicted of violating Fielding's "right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure."'" These more unusual applica-
tions of the criminal civil rights statutes declined, however, following the early
1970s, as prosecutors began applying other statutes to such crimes.59
But recent developments in federal criminal law have paved the way for
their potential resurgence. Most notably, in the 2016 McDonnell decision, the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the existing statutes used by prosecutors
to target public corruption at the state level.6 o The ultimate import of McDon-
nell continues to be a source of debate as it percolates through the lower courts,
but the decision has already been applied in reversing several prominent con-
victions on public corruption-related charges, including New York State As-
semblymen Dean Skelos and Sheldon Silver.61
In recent years, prosecutors have tested the waters for filling this void by
employing §§ 242 and 241 in the public corruption context. In Washington, for
example, a former attorney for United States Immigrations and Customs En-
forcement recently pled guilty to violating § 242 after committing fraud during
an immigration proceeding." In Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed
the conviction of a state court judge for violating § 242, in part for planting
methamphetamine in an employee's car and having her arrested.6 3 In 2016, the
56. Linda Charlton, Ehrlichman Is Convicted of Plot and Perjury in Ellsburg Break In;
Liddy and 2 Others Also Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 1974), http://www.nytimes.
com/1974/07/13/archives/ehrlichman-is-convicted-of-plot-and-perjury-in-ellsber
g-breakin.html [http://perma.cc/RJG7-TVW2]; Egil Krogh, The Break-in that
History Forgot, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
06/30/opinion/30krogh.html [http://perma.cc/2EDC-X2RC].
57. For a notable history of this period, see BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL
THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
58. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 919-29 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
59. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 277-80 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (noting that "not until 1972 did any court apply the Hobbs Act to bribery").
60. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371-72 (2016).
61. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Boston Globe "Spotlight Team" of
Oscar fame uncovered the hiring scheme. See Scott Allen, Agency Where Patronage
Is Job One, Bos. GLOBE (May 23, 2010), http://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2010/05/23/agency-where-patronage-job-one/pTGEMsjOCbgePJdVaxC9N
J/story.html [http://perma.cc/DS88-CGGW].
62. Defendant Jonathan Love's Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. Love,
No. 16-0005 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2016), 2016 WL 2607127.
63. United States v. Cochran, 682 F. App'x 828 (11th Cir. 2017).
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Sixth Circuit upheld the conviction of the Mayor Ruth Robinson of Martin,
Kentucky, along with her family members for violating § 241. The government
successfully convicted Robinson of violating § 241 for engaging in vote buying
during her reelection campaign.4
The statutes can potentially be employed to tackle all manner of illicit con-
duct at the state, local, or even national level. Some have argued, for example,
that § 242 should be used against prosecutors themselves as a means of punish-
ing prosecutorial misconduct.6 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court has "emphasize [d]
that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under section 1983 does
not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which oc-
curs . . . Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could
be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the
strength of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analog of section 1983."6
The potential use of the criminal civil rights statutes to monitor state and
local officials, however, plunges them into a contentious debate regarding the
nature and reach of federal oversight. Since the 1970s, criminal law in the Unit-
ed States has undergone a notable "federalization," and the realm of state and
local political corruption has been no exception."?
In many ways, local public corruption in particular seems to provide an
ideal candidate for federal oversight. Federal prosecutors have argued that fed-
eral enforcement efforts are required to "fill a vacuum created by the inability
or unwillingness of state and local law enforcement agencies to deal adequately
with the task of ferreting out corruption."" Under this line of reasoning, if cor-
ruption has permeated multiple local government institutions, it seems unreal-
istic to rely on local authorities to investigate and prosecute corruption that
may have permeated into the very mechanisms meant to police it.
64. United States v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2016). Their efforts-which in-
cluded bribery, coercion, and intimidation of voters-fell just short of their goal,
as Robinson lost the general election by three votes. Id. at 254.
65. Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY
AM. LAW 83-84 (2005) (arguing that prosecuting prosecutorial misconduct under
§ 242 might be most effective in the context of Brady violations).
66. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976).
67. See Charles Ruff, Federal Prosecution ofLocal Corruption: A Case Study in the Mak-
ing of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977); see also RICHMAN, STITH &
STUNTZ, supra note 26, at 2-8 (describing the growth of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion); Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding
the Alarm or "Crying Wolf", 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317 (2000) (cataloguing the
federalization of criminal law); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in
Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127 (1997) (examining the justifications for
and drawbacks of the increasing federalization of criminal law).
68. RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 26, at 2-8.
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As the federal government has enhanced its role in the prosecution of local
officials, however, a growing chorus of commentators and jurists have also
voiced separation of powers and federalism concerns.9 While the federal courts
at first acquiesced to federal prosecution in this area, the Supreme Court itself
has become increasingly alarmed by this federal intervention.70 Justice Thomas,
for example, has consistently decried the "stunning expansion of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by state and local laws-acts of
public corruption by state and local officials."'
The Supreme Court's concern about federal intrusion into the local police
power appears to have reached a high point of late. The Court noted in the
McDonnell decision, for example, that federalism "includes the prerogative to
regulate the permissible scope of interactions between state officials and their
constitutions."7 ' And it cautioned against the federal government's "setting the
standards [of] good government for local and state officials." 73 The Court has
also invoked the federalism canon in recent years in the service of narrowing
the application of other relatively broad federal criminal statutes.
74
III. PATHS FORWARD
As outlined above, two prominent statutes surrounded by a great deal of
doctrinal confusion seem poised to play a role in a variant of federal oversight
that has attracted a great deal of controversy. This Part argues that the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncements on qualified immunity will limit the use of and
assuage any constitutional concerns surrounding § 242, but the same cannot be
69. Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political Corrup-
tion, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 321, 334-45 (1983) ("[T]he broad discretion of federal
prosecutors to develop law enforcement policy in the local corruption context is
inconsistent with fundamental notions of federalism and separation of powers.").
70. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 294 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[E]ven when Congress has clearly decided to [regulate] state government offi-
cials, concerns of federalism play a vital role in evaluating the scope of the regula-
tion."); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 277-80 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) ("Not until 1972 did any court apply the Hobbs Act to bribery ... the
Courts of Appeals accepted the expansion with little disagreement, and this Court
has never had occasion to consider the matter.").
71. Evans, 504 U.S. at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2374 (2016).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2081-82 (2014) (holding that a
federal statute imposing criminal sanctions for the use of a chemical weapon did
not apply to a woman's attempt to poison her husband's mistress and reasoning
that "[t]his Court can reasonably insist on a clear indication that Congress in-
tended to reach purely local crimes before interpreting Section 229's expansive
language in a way that intrudes on the States' police power").
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said of §241, which poses more serious constitutional issues if employed in this
area.
With regards to § 242, the necessity of demonstrating that the accused act-
ed "under color of law" already negates many of the potential constitutional
concerns about the statute. First, Congress's power to enact § 242 can be traced
back to the Fourteenth Amendment because it satisfies the state action re-
quirement.75 And, because the statute targets those acting under color of law, it
arguably only punishes those who are already held to a higher standard of con-
duct.
Section 241, in contrast, was originally passed to target racially motivated
crimes committed by private actors, such as the Ku Klux Klan and similar or-
ganizations.6 Given its lack of a state action element, its constitutional justifica-
tion has been lodged in the Thirteenth Amendment, pursuant to Congress's
power to redress the "badges and incidents of slavery."" This distinction re-
mains significant. Courts have ignored the fact that § 241 cannot be classified as
merely the conspiracy provision of § 242. Rather, it targets a distinct offense:
racially motivated crimes perpetrated by non-state actors. Therefore, cases like
Baroni, where prosecutors tack on a § 241 charge to punish illicit acts commit-
ted by public officials devoid of racial motivation, pose significant constitution-
al concerns.
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the qualified immunity
doctrine, however, may limit the viability of either statute's use in cases like
Baroni. In the past five years the Court has reversed several qualified immunity
decisions, pointing to the Courts of Appeals' failures to apply the correct "clear-
ly established" analysis?8 The Court has moved from a standard that to be clear-
ly established "a right [must be] sufficiently clear that [a] 'reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right,"'79 to a stand-
ard that "every reasonable official would have understood that he violated a
right."so Furthermore, it has cast doubt on whether to be "clearly established
law" a relevant circuit court decision-without Supreme Court precedent on
point-suffices." The Court has also clarified that a circuit split regarding the
75. See generally Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800-02 (1987).
77. See Charles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal Protection Against Racially Mo-
tivated Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 689, 718-19 (1986).
78. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (reversing the Tenth Circuit's deni-
al of qualified immunity because of an erroneously applied "clearly established"
standard); see also City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015)
(collecting recent cases).
79. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 739 (2011).
8o. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
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constitutional "right" in question demonstrates that it has not been "clearly es-
tablished.""
Indeed, a recent application of § 242 demonstrates the importance of these
pronouncements. In United States v. Cochran, the defendant was a former state
magistrate judge who was convicted on multiple § 242 counts of sexual as-
sault.83 Cochran protested that he did not have "fair warning" that some of the
counts charged against him violated his secretary's "clearly established" Fourth
Amendment rights.8
The Court of Appeals found the defendant's argument persuasive, and it
relied on the Supreme Court's qualified immunity doctrine in doing so. It
looked to whether "binding opinions from the United States Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the highest court in the state where
the action is filed ... gave [the defendant] fair warning that his [action] was un-
constitutional.""* The Court held that even though the Fourth Amendment was
"implicated . . . no such decision has addressed a sufficiently similar factual sit-
uation so as to provide reasonable warning to Cochran that his conduct violat-
ed the constitutional rights of [the victim].""
Consider also the employment of § 242 in Baroni, in which Baroni and
Kelly were convicted of depriving the residents of Fort Lee of their "right to lo-
calized travel." 7 As the New Jersey District Court noted, the Supreme Court has
never recognized a constitutional right to localized travel.' Meanwhile, federal
Courts of Appeals across the country have been divided on the issue for dec-
ades.9 Given the Supreme Court's migration in its qualified immunity doctrine,
convictions such as Baroni's will likely prove vulnerable on appeal.90
81. Id. at 2045 ("Assuming for the sake of argument that a right can be 'clearly estab-
lished' by circuit precedent despite disagreement in the Courts of Appeals.");
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665-66 (2012) ("Assuming arguendo that con-
trolling Court of Appeals' authority could be a dispositive source of clearly estab-
lished law in the circumstances of this case.").
82. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1868 (2017) ("[Tlhe fact that the courts are di-
vided ... demonstrates that the law on the point is not well established.").
83. 682 F. App'x 828 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 834.
85. Id. at 839-40.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Baroni, No. 15-193, 2016 WL 3388302 (D.N.J. June 13, 2016); see
also United States v. Baroni, No. 15-193, 2017 WL 787122 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2017)
(denial of motion for acquittal on the § 242 counts).
88. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *9 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has not yet recognized a
constitutional right to localized travel.").
89. See, e.g., King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1971) (recognizing the right); Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807,
809 (1st Cir. 1970) (same). But see, e.g., Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749
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Of course, those hoping to encourage additional prosecutions under either
statute could argue that they should be untethered from the qualified immunity
standard. Many argue that qualified immunity derives from a common-law de-
fense that existed when § 1983 was adopted.9' Yet whatever the merits of this
reliance on common law tort doctrine, there has never been any indication that
such a defense was available in the criminal context before the adoption of the
statutes.92 Others have urged that this limitation on § 1983 is necessary given
that it is written in strict liability terms.93 The fair notice concern, however, does
not carry the same weight in the context of the criminal civil rights statutes for
the simple reason that they do contain an explicit mens rea requirement.94
Despite the force of these arguments, the doctrinal confusion surrounding
§ 242 urges caution in its application. The federal government's parsimonious
use of the statute reflects a balance that has been struck between federal offi-
cials, the judiciary, and state and local law enforcement. That is not to say that §
242 should never be used to regulate the conduct of state and local officials.
While this Comment has cast doubt on the continued viability of § 242's use in
the context of protecting rights that have not been "clearly established," such as
was the case in Baroni, uses of § 242 to punish other acts of misconduct com-
mitted by officials, in particular acts of sexual misconduct, remain quite clearly
within the ambit of the statute. The Department of Justice's petite policy reflects
the current reality that state and local officials are the primary law enforcement
agents,9 5 but in some instances federal law enforcement oversight is likely need-
(W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 596, 755 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the existence
of the right); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (vali-
dating an ordinance which required city employees to live within the city, because
of no fundamental "right to commute").
go. The defendants are currently appealing their convictions on the § 242 counts to
the Third Circuit.
91. Baude, supra note 16, at 52-55; see also id. at 55-60 (questioning the historical va-
lidity of this claim).
92. Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 401 (1993) (arguing for the creation of a good faith defense in
the criminal context).
93. Baude, supra note 16, at 105.
94. Id.; see. e.g., United States v. Kerley, 643 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing
§ 242 conviction based on the trial court's failure to properly instruct jury as to
the meaning and requirements of willfulness, noting willfulness is one essential el-
ement of § 242 and crucial to jury deliberation).
95. U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-2.031, U.S. DEPT. JUST. (July 2009) ("This policy pre-
cludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, following a prior
state or federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or transac-
tion(s) unless three substantive prerequisites are satisfied: first, the matter must
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ed to monitor state and local agents when the mechanisms of local enforcement
have broken down.
The same cannot be said, however, of § 241, which has always presented
constitutional concerns and whose utility has been significantly diminished giv-
en the passage of more targeted federal hate crime statutes.96 Using a statute
predicated on Congress's powers derived from the Thirteenth Amendment to
punish any person for all manner of crimes subverts the Amendment's mean-
ing. The current equilibrium that has been struck between federal and local law
enforcement reflects centuries of negotiated boundaries.7 We would do wisely
to exercise caution in threatening that equilibrium via the haphazard migration
of deeply contested statutes.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has assessed the contested arenas of both federal oversight
of state and local officials and civil rights enforcement in the criminal sphere. It
has revealed that recent developments in both domains have set the two on a
veritable collision course. Proscribing the ideal level of federal oversight of state
and local officials remains a difficult task, but our Constitution does provide
guidance. This Comment has ultimately urged caution in applying the criminal
civil rights statutes to the crime of public corruption and has been particularly
skeptical of § 241's use in this area, given its constitutional grounding in the
Thirteenth Amendment.
This is not to say that the officials described above, such as the Baroni de-
fendants, are innocent of all crimes (and indeed they were convicted of others).
But, as Justice Black most famously put it, "[b] ad men, like good men, are enti-
tled to be tried and sentenced in accordance with law."9' Whether one agrees
with this Comment or not, it hopes more modestly to provide a greater under-
standing of what the "law" at issue here really is. For before suggesting areas in
which civil rights law can go, we need a greater collective understanding of
where it has been and the purposes it should serve.
96. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2012) (providing criminal sanctions for anyone who
"willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, any person ... participating in or
enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided or
administered by the United States ... because of his race, color, religion or na-
tional origin").
97. Richman, Stith, & Stuntz, supra note 26.
98. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 309 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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